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Citizenship, Ethnicity, and Territory: the Politics of Selecting by Origin in Post-
Communist Southeast Europe1 
 
Marko Žilović, University of Belgrade2 
 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to conceptualise, map, and make a step toward more 
comprehensively explaining variations in preferential naturalisation regimes in post-
communist Southeast Europe. In doing so it makes three interrelated contributions to 
the field of citizenship studies. First, to conceptualise dependent variables more 
exactly I follow the recent trend of disaggregating the concept of citizenship by 
focusing on external selectivity regimes. I develop a typology of these regimes that 
combines dimensions of ethnicity and territoriality. Second, relying on the data and 
country reports produced in the first phase of the CITSEE and EUDO research 
projects I systematically map temporal and cross-case variations in external 
selectivity regimes of all 12 post-communist cases of Southeast Europe. Third, 
utilising advantages of this comparative view I build and demonstrate initial 
plausibility of a comprehensive explanatory model that builds on the existing 
research by delimiting scope conditions and relative causal weight of several existing 
explanations. I find that the politics of selecting by origin in post-communist 
Southeast Europe has been crucially shaped by differences (a) between old nation-
states prone to act as external national homelands, newly emerging nationalizing 
states, and ethnically divided states; and (b) between the years of ‘thickened history’ 
in the early post-communist period and the later, politically calmer period after 2000. 
 
Keywords: 
Citizenship, external selectivity regimes, naturalisation, ethnic politics, emigration, 
kin-state, post-communism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I start by analytically carving out the conceptual space of external 
selectivity regimes, and by developing a typology of these regimes. Using the 
developed typology, I systematically map temporal and cross-case variations in 
external selectivity regimes of 12 post-communist cases in the broad region of 
Southeast Europe. I show that in this period, the region experienced a trend towards 
ethnic post-territorial external selectivity. Under this regime of selectivity, those that 
                                                 
1 A previous draft of this CITSEE working paper was presented at the ASN Annual Convention, at the 
Columbia University on 19 April 2012. I would like to thank the participants in the “Negotiating 
Minority Identities in Southern Europe” panel for their helpful comments, and to the Open Society 
Foundation for enabling me to participate in this convention. I would also like to thank Jovan 
Teokarević for his reading of a previous draft. 
2 marko.zilovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs  
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a state recognises as co-ethnics can become citizens without ever residing or 
intending to reside in that state. However, this regional drift has not encompassed all 
the countries, and even those that eventually got there, did so at different times, 
through different pathways, and as I will show, with different motives. Third, 
utilising advantages of this comparative view I begin to build a more comprehensive 
explanatory model that builds on the existing research by attempting to delimit 
scope conditions and the relative causal weight of several existing explanations. 
Given that citizenship is “a notoriously polyvalent concept” (Joppke 2010: 1), 
it is important to clearly define the area in which I research. States pursue a variety of 
(sometimes conflicting) purposes and functions through their citizenship regulations. 
One of those purposes is to recognise and strengthen special ties (commonly, but not 
always, ethnic ties) through which certain groups are deemed connected to the state 
prior and independent of their legal citizenship status (Vink and Bauböck 2011: 16). 
To achieve this, states complement standard naturalisation procedures with 
provisions for facilitated naturalisation of these favoured outsiders. I am researching 
variation in how these provisions enhance the access of favoured groups to 
citizenship in post-communist Southeast Europe. To conceptualise my dependent 
variables more exactly I use the concept of external selectivity regimes, by which I 
mean the rules specifying which groups of applicants, and under what conditions, 
are by virtue of their collective ties favoured by a state for naturalisation, or for 
comparable citizenship-acquiring procedures. ‘External’ here refers to the dichotomy 
between citizens and non-citizens regardless of their ethnicity or their current place 
of residence. By speaking about ‘regimes’ of external selectivity I indicate that I am 
not remaining with the pure content analysis of laws and by-laws. I also take into 
account how states relate to prospective citizens through actual administrative 
practices that need to be interpreted in their political, historical and social context 
(Shaw and Štiks 2010: 6-8) 
External selectivity through facilitated naturalisation is certainly not the only 
channel available to states that wish to reach out to the favoured outsiders. Vink and 
Bauböck (2011: 16-17), in their conceptual framework for disaggregating citizenship,  
rightly note that the rules governing transfer of citizenship by descent to children 
born abroad to citizen parent(s) (ius sanguinis abroad) are another important mode of 
recognising special ties to the favoured groups. Where citizenship is transferred 
through ius sanguinis abroad more easily, fewer potential applicants will need to go 
through facilitated naturalisation later in life. In this sense ius sanguinis abroad is a 
background condition influencing the overall share of cases in which facilitated 
naturalisation clauses are invoked. The cases in my region exhibit only limited 
variation in ius sanguinis abroad. They all automatically transfer citizenship to 
children born abroad to two citizen-parents, and they automatically or quasi-
automatically transfer citizenship to children who only have one parent who is a 
citizen. Thus, the shared effect of ius sanguinis in the region is to reduce the overall 
importance of facilitated naturalisation procedures by providing an easier path to 
citizenship to those who retain an uninterrupted intergenerational continuity of 
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citizenship. More important variation exists in three of my cases – Moldova before 
2003, Bosnia, and Montenegro – in which dual citizenship is more heavily restricted. 
Children born abroad to citizens of these states may have a strong disincentive to 
register or retain citizenship gained ius sanguinis if it clashes with the possibility of 
holding citizenship in their countries of residence. Despite this variation, ius sanguinis 
abroad, by itself, has an ambiguous effect on external selectivity. Its selective effects 
are ultimately conditional upon the initial ethnic structure of citizenry, upon 
selectivity in naturalisation rules (Vink and Bauböck 2011: 13), and upon the 
availability of dual citizenship. All these factors are built into the analytic framework 
that I present fully in the second section. Because they powerfully shape selectivity 
effects of ius sanguinis abroad I mostly relegate my discussion of this mode of 
reaching out to favoured groups to the background. 
Similarly, I am restricting my research only to preferential avenues to full 
citizenship. External quasi-citizenship, or what has been cleverly termed 
‘ethnizenship’ (Bauböck 2007: 2396), remains outside of my main focus. Many states 
of the region – Romania, Albania, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and perhaps 
soon Croatia – are offering quasi-citizenship rights in cultural, educational, or socio-
economic spheres to co-ethnics residing abroad. Ethnizenship does not amount to 
full membership and the full bundle of rights associated with citizenship. Yet, in 
combination with different external selectivity regimes it can serve the purpose of 
nurturing special ties to favoured outsiders in different ways. For instance, Serbia 
and Slovenia combine ethnicised post-territorial selectivity with ethnizenship in 
order to reach co-ethnics that are not able or willing to become full dual citizens (i.e. 
their host state discourages dual citizenship). Other citizenship regimes may use 
ethnizenship as a substitute to full blown ethnic post-territorial citizenship. Such was 
the case with the Hungarian Status law of 2001. Ethnizenship is thus a part of an 
overall state strategy of reaching out to favoured outsiders. Though I mention it 
when it significantly impacts on the interpretation of external selectivity regimes, my 
focus remains on facilitated access to full citizenship.  
Finally, I am not looking into more general differences in how states in the 
region naturalise applicants through standard naturalisation procedures, nor do I 
include widespread rules governing naturalisation based upon individual special ties 
such as marriage with a citizen. I am principally interested in the questions of 
whether, how and why states of the region decide to selectively relax exclusivity of 
citizenship in order to facilitate naturalisation of members of groups defined as 
having special collective ties to the state in question. However, I only partially agree 
with Vink and Bauböck (2011: 16-17) who suggest that restoration of citizenship 
should be seen as facilitated naturalisation based on individual ties. This is certainly 
the case with re-acquisitions by former citizens, and often by the first generation 
descendants of former citizens. Consequently, I do not take into account issues 
related, for instance, to the correction of specific personal injustices, such as 
provisions restoring citizenship to political emigrants who were stripped of it during 
communist rule. However, in cases when these rules provide facilitated access to 
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citizenship to grandchildren of former citizens, the personal history of applicants 
becomes increasingly irrelevant, and their genuine and effective links to the state in 
question become dubious. This is particularly so when restoration of citizenship is 
used to correct perceived geopolitical injustices, such as in Romanian provisions for 
restoring citizenship, and in similar Hungarian provisions adopted in 2010. In those 
cases it seems to me more accurate to describe restoration of former citizenship as a 
veiled form of facilitated naturalisation based on collective ethnic ties. 
While the existing studies sometimes explore a richer variety of policy 
instruments that states use to engage ethnic kin, or are richer in examining political 
nuances of individual cases, my goal in this paper is comparative, but restricted to a 
relatively narrow aspect of overall citizenship politics. There is no basis to 
automatically assume that the same variables explain the content of different 
segments of overall citizenship regimes, nor indeed a basis to assume that different 
purposes and functional segments of citizenship form a coherent whole that can be 
compared and explained in a single stroke. Instead, disaggregating citizenship into 
smaller sub-regimes – such as external selectivity regimes - facilitates focused 
comparison across cases (Vink and Bauböck 2011). In searching for patterns and 
causes in this comparison, existing research on preferential naturalisation offers a 
range of explanations for the motives behind particular state strategies. Similarly, 
research on broader citizenship politics offers several important explanatory 
approaches whose applicability specifically to the sphere of external selectivity is 
worth considering. 
Joppke (2003; 2010: 70) has noted that left-right political competition remains 
relevant (though not in all contexts decisive) for the variable dynamics of de- and re-
ethnicisation of citizenship. This has been an important reminder against the claims 
that ‘idioms of nationhood’ tightly constrain the evolution of citizenship (Brubaker 
1992). Not that notions of nationhood and ethnic solidarity do not matter in this 
research field, but they are increasingly recognised as being “too blunt a conceptual 
instrument” (Brubaker and Kim 2011: 69) to explain significant variations in the ways 
citizenship, ethnicity, and territoriality interact. Similarly, many researchers focusing 
specifically on post-communist citizenship have long been aware that politics trumps 
identity (King and Melvin: 1999: 134-138). When attempting to unpack such politics 
in the post-communist region, some of the best research has employed careful 
analysis of single cases. Using the case of Croatia, Štiks (2010) finds a widespread 
nationalising drive in the initial post-communist citizenship policies, but also finds 
that the EU has in this area acted as a moderating force. Focusing on the case of 
Hungary, Waterbury (2010) has refined and advanced the party competition 
argument. She persuasively shows how right-wing Fidesz has strategically used the 
issue of Hungarian trans-border communities to increase its own “domestic political 
legitimacy, organizational capacity, and ideological positioning” (Waterbury 2010: 8). 
Using the example of Ukraine, Shevel (2009; 2010) integrates political competition 
and national identity arguments. She shows that civic citizenship regimes in the post-
Soviet space may arise even in the absence of a civic understanding of nation. 
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Instead, they can emerge as a rational compromise between competing non-civic 
visions of national identity embodied in different party blocs.  
Although these studies have offered important insights, by tending to neglect 
comparisons in favour of concentrating on single ‘instructive’ cases, they have not 
sufficiently highlighted and explained variations that exist within the external 
selectivity regimes in post-communist Europe. They have also not done enough to 
specify scope conditions for the proposed independent variables and causal 
mechanisms. As a step to overcoming these shortcomings, in this paper I employ 
medium-N analysis that allows relatively thick description comparing politics of 
external selectivity both across cases, as well as within cases in different periods. In 
this way I am able both to draw original inferences, and to initially test the reach of 
the existing explanations. My primary goal is to show the plausibility of my claim 
that several existing explanations for the politics of selecting by origin in post-
communism are mutually compatible but that their relative causal weight across 
periods and cases is conditional upon contextual scope conditions that I identify in 
this paper. Even so, my case selection within post-communist Southeast Europe 
ensures that the cases share a broadly similar historical context, while the region still 
exhibits numerous variations in both dependent and independent variables. 
The first contextual trait shared by all the cases is that their regimes of 
selectivity were initially designed – or are deeply influenced by the political legacy of 
events taking place – in the highly volatile historical period triggered by the sudden 
demise of communist regimes. This period presented a critical juncture in which 
popular mobilisation around various issues, in combination with the breakdown of 
international and national institutional structures, offered otherwise rare political 
opportunities. The second trait influencing in some ways all my cases comes from the 
fact that external selectivity in the post-communist Southeast Europe often does not 
primarily target diasporas, but kin-communities residing in neighbouring countries. 
This makes it more difficult to disentangle issues of citizenship and ethnicity from 
territorial issues and issues of international politics. Thirdly, post-communist 
countries of Southeast Europe are rarely final destinations of economic immigrants, 
so the constituencies that in richer states often pushed for more inclusive 
naturalisation rules (Joppke 2003, Benhabib 2004) were mostly absent from my 
region. 
These shared traits also make post-communist Southeast Europe into an 
analytic unit distinct from the better known (Joppke 2005) recent examples of ethnic 
selectivity, such as those exhibited by Israeli and German “laws of return”, and the 
Spanish and Portuguese preference for naturalising Hispanic and Lusophone 
applicants. It is true that the contextual conditions shared by my cases are also 
shared by many other post-communist European cases. However, limiting my 
attention only to Southeast Europe provides a more manageable setting for 
qualitative research. It is also better suited for a comparative approach that had the 
seven cases emerging from the former Yugoslavia plus Albania in its initial focus. In 
my research I have found it necessary to test some of my own thinking originally 
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developed from these eight cases using an additional layer of comparable cases. To 
do that, I have turned to the post-communist countries of Southeast Europe, and I 
have somewhat unusually broadened this region to also include Hungary. While 
Hungary is rarely seen as part of Southeast Europe, it is an important player in the 
selectivity nexus with several other states of the region. So for reasons of both 
practicality and political importance I have decided to add it to my list of cases, 
which for the sake of brevity I will usually refer to as post-communist Southeast 
Europe. 
This relatively ambitious research effort is building on the first phase of the 
CITSEE research project that collected data on citizenship in the countries emerging 
from the former Yugoslavia plus Albania. The wide range of material collected 
enables more comparatively framed research in the second phase of the project, of 
which this paper is a part. Because this paper situates the comparison of post-
Yugoslav cases in a broader regional setting, I have also used the result of the EUDO 
research project. These two big research projects between them collected and 
analysed original data on citizenship issues in almost all European states using 
synchronised methodology.3 Their results are presented in several databases, in 
individual country reports based on primary research by a large number of native 
speaking scholars, and in comparative and conceptual papers. In my research I have 
relied extensively on all these sources. 
I proceed in the second section to introduce my novel analytic typology of 
external selectivity regimes. I justify the criteria used to develop it, and demonstrate 
the analytic utility of this typology by mapping the current state of affairs and 
temporal evolution of external selectivity regimes in post-communist Southeast 
Europe. I show that the region exhibits a puzzling degree of variation in outcomes 
and trajectories. In the third section I make an initial step toward explaining these 
numerous variations by providing a relatively thick comparative description of the 
politics behind external selectivity in the region. 
 
2. Conceptualising and Mapping External Selectivity in Post-Communist 
Southeast Europe 
 
The accessibility of citizenship, even for favoured groups, can depend on numerous 
legislative and procedural details such as the number and geographic spread of 
places where an application for citizenship can be submitted, the price of applying, 
or the usual time taken to decide on an application. While all these are certainly 
relevant aspects of particular external selectivity regimes, in this paper I am more 
interested in developing concepts that can serve as meaningful ‘data containers’ 
(Sartori 1970: 1039; Gerring, 1999: 357-361) for my broader comparative goal. For this 
                                                 
3 CITSEE project (The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former 
Yugoslavia) is based at the University of Edinburgh. More is available online at http://citsee.eu/. 
EUDO Citizenship project (European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship) is based at the 
European University Institute in Florence and can be located online at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/. 
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reason I propose to focus on the most widespread means of facilitated naturalisation, 
and to classify external selectivity regimes in post-communist Southeast Europe 
according to two basic criteria. The first of these criteria is whether the group eligible 
for the most facilitated naturalisation procedure is ethnically defined, or a group 
defined by territorial origin. I term the former ethnic, and the latter emigrant 
selectivity regimes. My second analytic criterion is whether members of the most 
favoured group – either emigrant or ethnic – are required to establish residence in 
the state in order to become eligible for the most favourable naturalisation track. 
Where residence is required I speak of welcoming selectivity regimes. Where 
residence requirement is waived I speak of post-territorial selectivity regimes. Cross-
tabulation of the two criteria yields the following analytical typology: 
 
External 
selectivity 
regimes Residence requirement 
E
th
n
ic
is
at
io
n
 
 Yes No 
More Ethnic welcoming Ethnic post-
territorial 
Less Emigrant 
welcoming 
Emigrant post-
territorial 
 
Table 1 
In addition, in order to capture more nuances within these major types of 
external selectivity regimes, I further divide each of them into four sub-types 
depending on where a specific sub-type stands on a vertical ‘ethnic-emigrant’ 
continuum, and on a horizontal ‘welcoming-post-territorial’ axis.4 
Under ethnic regimes of external selectivity a person seeking to acquire 
citizenship is required to somehow prove that he or she belongs to the favoured 
ethnicity, which is usually the most numerous one in a country. Usually there is a 
degree of vagueness about what counts as valid proof, but once this proof is 
produced an applicant qualifies for the most facilitated method of naturalisation 
available. In contrast, to qualify under emigrant selectivity regimes, an applicant 
needs to prove personal or ancestral origin from the territory of the state in question. 
Emigrant selectivity regimes include anyone with a valid territorial origin, and they 
exclude co-ethnics without this kind of territorial origin. Ethnic selectivity regimes 
include everyone recognised as a co-ethnic without any need to produce proofs of 
territorial origin. Ethnic selectivity regimes usually do not entirely exclude the 
possibility of naturalisation of people of non-favoured ethnicity. However, such 
people must go through more burdensome naturalisation procedures, even though 
                                                 
4 I discuss some of the details in the paragraphs that follow but for the full details see Appendix. 
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their genuine and effective link to the state in question may be stronger than the link 
of some co-ethnics. If even this alternative path to naturalisation were denied that 
would amount to controversial and currently rare regime of negative ethnic 
selectivity, in which members of certain ethnicities are denied legitimate access to 
citizenship (Joppke 2005: 21-23). 
Naturalisation rules and practices are complex matters, and divisions between 
ethnic and emigrant selectivity are not always clear-cut. For instance, some emigrant 
selectivity regimes contain culture-specific conditions, the most common of which is 
the ability to speak the official language of the naturalising state. Even though from a 
normative perspective language requirements may be seen as serving both liberal 
and illiberal means (Dumbrava 2010: 11-12), on the immediate practical level they 
can pose a somewhat bigger challenge for applicants who are not tested in their 
mother tongue. Thus, instead of a dichotomy between ethnic and emigrant 
selectivity, it is better to think about a continuum on which there can be various 
degrees of ethnicisation, which is something I try to capture through the sub-types in 
my analytic typology. The regime sub-type that is perhaps most difficult to code is 
the one where the most preferable method of naturalisation is extended to 
descendants of former citizens from the territories that used to belong to the country 
in question. Taken at their face value, these regimes require proof of territorial and 
not of ethnic origin. However, in the cases of Romania and Hungary (since 2010) my 
view is that intention of lawmakers was to use former citizenship as a proxy for 
ethnicity, albeit one useful for denying accusations about the ‘illiberal’ character of 
selectivity. After Romania lost its previous territories to Soviet Union, a number of 
people of different ethnic origin moved to those territories, while the influx of ethnic 
Romanians was very limited. Similarly, in the territories Hungary lost, the number of 
ethnic Hungarians decreased in favour of ethnicities that constituted core groups in 
the neighbouring states. Because of this, the effect of using this ‘extraterritorial’ 
criterion is to maximise the number of eligible Hungarians and Romanian-speakers, 
while excluding many applicants of different ethnicities. Targeting perceived co-
ethnics is further advanced through the Romanian practice of formally testing 
applicants’ knowledge of Romanian, and Hungary’s informal check of applicants’ 
competence in Hungarian language. 
However, extraterritorial former citizenship is an imperfect proxy for ethnicity 
since certain members of non-targeted ethnicities may still qualify for the most 
favoured method of naturalisation (i.e. they may speak sufficient Romanian, and 
have ancestors who were citizens of interwar Romania). Nonetheless, this 
imperfection is not that much different from any other criteria for recognising co-
ethnics. Given that ethnic identification is a less exclusive and relatively malleable 
trait, no criteria can perfectly target “real” co-ethnics and only co-ethnics. To reduce 
this unavoidable problem, states with more ethnicised selectivity regimes prefer 
applicants who can show documents in which their ethnicity is clearly stated, or 
those who have certificates of continuously belonging to ethnic diaspora 
organisations, or of being affiliated with an appropriate church. Sometimes it is 
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enough for applicants to simply have an appropriate sounding name. Outcome is 
less certain for those applicants who can only demonstrate soft cultural affinity. In 
principle, these are universally acquirable skills, such as command of language, or 
knowledge of constitutional system and national history. In these cases it is usually 
up to the administration to make a judgement on whether the ethnic origin of an 
applicant is “genuine”. The fact that states even engage in guessing the ethnicity of 
applicants, and the fact that the outcome of this guessing influences the availability 
of a particular route to citizenship, stands in contrast to emigrant selectivity regimes 
in which a person is centrally concerned with proving his or her territorial origin. 
The extraterritorial culture-specific regimes of Romania and Hungary stand 
somewhere in between, not because their way of targeting co-ethnics is less precise, 
but because in eschewing explicit ethnic criteria, their selectivity remains confined to 
a territorially defined sub-group of co-ethnics. 
Within emigrant selectivity regimes there are important differences in 
generational reach. Repatriation rights of former citizens and their first generation 
descendants are part of the widespread increase in tolerance of dual citizenship. 
Facilitated naturalisation of emigrants of the second generation and beyond is more 
controversial (Joppke 2010: 65). No matter how deep the generational reach, the 
target group of emigrant selectivity may in practice overlap with the target group of 
positive ethnic selectivity to different degrees. This obviously depends on how 
multiethnic the historical population of the country is. But emigrant selectivity is 
more ethnically neutral, at least because ethnic origin is never a sufficient condition 
for facilitated naturalisation. For instance, Macedonian facilitated naturalisation rules 
benefit territorially defined emigrants and their first generation descendants. A 
beneficiary in this regime could be an ethnic Albanian from Switzerland claiming 
citizenship of Macedonia based on parental origin in the territory of Macedonia. In 
contrast, an ethnic Macedonian from Serbia who is active in Macedonian diaspora 
organisations would not qualify under Macedonian emigrant-centred selectivity if it 
were not his/her parents, but his/her grandparents who left Macedonia, and if the 
intergenerational continuity of transferring citizenship has been interrupted for 
whatever reason. 
It is easier to discern where a particular case belongs on the horizontal axis of 
my analytic typology. The criterion for doing this is whether members of the most 
favoured group – either emigrant or ethnic – are required to establish residence in a 
state that is granting them citizenship. If naturalisation rules require one to live some 
time within a state before becoming its citizen, the message sent to the favoured 
group is: if you come and live here you will be welcomed and recognized as full 
citizens more easily than the “real foreigners”. Thus, I term these regimes welcoming. 
Here citizenship is imagined as territorialized in a way characteristic of a 
Westphalian international order. By contrast, in untying the nexus between territory 
and citizenship post-territorial regimes of selectivity seemingly make a break with the 
norms of this order (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2010: 2-5). While retention of tighter ties 
between emigrant communities and their countries of origin is a global trend, the 
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extension of citizenship to include trans-border ethnic kin communities often sparks 
international controversies. In many states targeted by neighbours’ post-territorial 
selectivity regimes a reasonable suspicion arises about how post-Westphalian these 
regimes really are. States often justify post-territorial selectivity by hijacking 
contemporary parlance of trans-national forms of membership. Perhaps hijacking of 
this emancipatory parlance can be used not only to cover up the new modes of 
exclusion (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2010: 4), but also to cover up a very Westphalian 
intention to re-tie citizenship to an enlarged state territory (Bauböck 2010: 2-3). This is 
especially the case when states offer citizenship to co-ethnics residing within the 
jurisdiction of other states unilaterally and in a highly politicised manner invoking 
arguments of historical injustice. The line separating welcoming and post-territorial 
citizenship regimes has thus often been the line separating cases that give rise to 
accusations of silent irredentism, or at least to accusations of ethnic populism. 
Using these analytic criteria, and based on the databases and country reports 
produced in the previous phase of CITSEE and EUDO research, I have coded the 
current external selectivity regimes of 12 post-communist cases in Southeast Europe 
(Table 4). I do the same in separate tables for the post-communist trajectories of each 
case (Table 2, and Table 3). The medium-N analysis employed here has the 
advantage that it allows for greater measurement validity, which is especially 
important bearing in mind the often ambiguous wording of citizenship laws and 
various grey zones in administrative practices. The way in which this measurement 
validity is achieved inevitably involves the exercise of judgement by the researcher, 
and as such is open to debate. In the Appendix I provide the detailed coding criteria I 
have used, as well as the coding results for each case over time. This makes my 
coding judgements transparent, consistent across cases, and open to critique, while it 
enables me to develop a typology of regimes of external selectivity that allows 
comparative analysis to proceed.  
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Early 1990s, 
initial cases 
Residence requirement 
 
E
th
n
ic
is
at
io
n
 
 Yes No 
 
 
 
More 
Bulgaria 
(1991, 1998) 
Hungary 
(1993) 
 Slovenia (1991) 
Croatia (1991) 
Albania (1992) 
  
 
 Romania (1990, 
1991) 
 
 
 
 
Less 
 FR Yugoslavia 
(1996) 
Macedonia (1992)  
 
Moldova5   
(1991) 
   
Table 2 
Shifts and 
entrants Residence requirement 
E
th
n
ic
is
at
io
n
 
 Yes No 
 
 
 
More 
Bulgaria 
(2001) 
Hungary 
(2010) 
 
 Slovenia 
Croatia 
(1998) Albania 
Serbia (2004) 
    
Romania (2001-
2007) 
 
 
 
Less 
  
FR Yugoslavia 
 
Macedonia 
Kosovo (2008) 
 
Moldova 
(2003) 
Bosnia (1997, 
1999) 
Montenegro 
(1999, 2007) 
 
  
Table 3 
 
 
                                                 
5 Before 2003 Moldova had an undifferentiated 10 year residence requirement for everyone. Combined 
with the constitutional rejection of dual citizenship, this makes itan exceptional case without any kind 
of selectively facilitated naturalisation based on collective ties. I code it also exceptionally as 
‘restrictive’, and it should actually be graphically located outside of my quadrants. 
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More 
Albania 
 
  Slovenia 
Croatia 
Bulgaria 
Serbia 
   
 
 
Hungary6 
Romania6 
Less 
  Macedonia7 
Kosovo7 
 
 
Bosnia 
Montenegro  Moldova 
 
Table 4 
Some patterns are immediately observable from these tables. First, most of the 
countries in the region currently have some sort of post-territorial citizenship, though 
states differ in degrees to which access to this citizenship is ethnicised. Second, ethnic 
post-territorial external selectivity emerged in two separate temporal waves. One 
wave occurred in the early 1990s, and the other one has been happening since 2001. 
This leaves Albania as the only ethnically non-divided state in the region that has not 
shifted to the ethnic post-territorial type, opting instead for a mildly welcoming 
ethnic selectivity regime. In the following section I make initial steps toward 
comprehensively explaining these patterns and exceptions. 
 
3. Politics of Selecting by Origin: Party Politics Matters… Eventually 
 
Alternative pathways can lead to very similar outcomes, and multiple causes can be 
simultaneously pulling the cases in the same or in opposing directions. The search 
for parsimonious explanations has its limits in the need to be fair to the complexity of 
the underlying puzzle. By relaxing assumptions of mono-causality I am able to build 
                                                 
6 Because bilingualism is much more common in Moldova than in the regions that used to belong to 
Hungary, the effects of the Romanian external selectivity regime are in practice less ethnically 
exclusive. Hungarian regime is de facto less “imprecise” in excluding members of other ethnicities. 
7 Macedonia and Kosovo belong to my emigrant culture-specific sub-type because they are cases in 
which linguistic differences between major communities are high, while their selectivity regimes - 
though not requiring proof of ethnic origin – do require applicants to demonstrate language 
competence. Kosovo’s selectivity regime is more inclusive since it demands competence in Albanian 
or Serbian, while in Macedonia only competence in Macedonian will suffice. 
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on the existing approaches by weighing the causal strength of several variables in 
different cases and periods. My central claim is that the relative causal weight of 
explanatory variables has been crucially shaped by differences (a) between old 
nation-states prone to act as external national homelands, newly emerging 
nationalizing states, and ethnically divided states; and (b) between the early post-
communist years of ‘thickened history’ (Beissinger 2002: 27) and the later politically 
calmer period after 2000. Through the following four subsections I describe the 
political dynamics under these different conditions. Before proceeding, I want to give 
several caveats about my use of labels ‘left’ and ‘right’ in what follows, because I find 
that throughout the period left-right political competition was an important, though 
often not decisive, force in shaping external selectivity regimes. 
Left and Right are intuitive and widely used but notoriously underspecified 
concepts in political science (Mair and Mudde 1998: 214). To use an easy example 
from my cases: are Milosevic’s and Illiescu’s nominally leftist parties pursuing 
nationalistic policies to be treated as leftists or not? To avoid this confusion, in this 
paper I follow Wittenberg (2006: 34-37) who defines party blocs genetically and 
relationally. In this approach, communist successor parties are always leftists. 
Regardless of shifting ideology, policies and symbolism they retain an organisational 
continuity and leftist (self-)perception that makes their identity recognizable over 
time. Even Serbian and Romanian ex-communist parties were sometimes accused of 
not being “true to the nation” but mere communist converts. Crucially, if all the 
parties pursuing some nationalist policies were to be considered simply nationalistic, 
the notion of party identities would lose explanatory leverage. It would be 
dangerously close to tautology to first deduce party identity from some of their 
actions, and then to use this identity to explain the very same actions, or their subset. 
This would obscure the critical importance of understanding the context in which 
some ex-communists turned toward nationalist policies while their sister parties in 
neighbouring states behaved differently, or indeed why the very same nationalist ex-
communists in different periods behaved differently.  
In relation to the ex-communist Left, I define major parties opposed to them as 
being on the political Right, while conceding that this glosses over major fault-lines 
within this opposing bloc (Hanley 2004). Over the years, as old regime-new regime 
cleavage subsided, some of these parties would successfully refashion and reposition 
themselves as centrist liberals, agrarians, populists, or even social-democrats. To 
capture this evolution in how party systems in the region are structured, I will use 
the labels ‘ex-communist left’ and ‘anti-communist right’ to describe major parties in 
the early post-communist years. When I move to discuss later years I will drop this 
reference to the communist period, and simply talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’ depending 
again on organisational continuity and inter-party relations and perceptions as they 
evolved. However, some party systems – especially the post-conflict cases or very 
small countries – are difficult to analyse in terms of political left and right. I will deal 
with these on a case-by-case basis, when and if peculiarities of party systems are 
relevant for issues of external selectivity. 
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3.1. First Wave: Nationalizing Novices and Structural Demographic Constraints 
 
Almost without exception newly emerging states in the post-communist Europe 
sought to establish their credentials as ‘national homelands’ (Brubaker 1996: 103-106). 
To achieve this they engaged in nationalizing practices both in their citizenship 
regimes, and in their wider policies. The message that these policies were conveying 
is that the newly emerging states were to be states for their titular nations. To 
compensate for perceived past injustices, to mark new ethnic hierarchy in the state, 
and to justify the independent existence of novel states, it was important to send this 
political message. It was sent by promoting the language or script of the titular 
nation, its version of history, culture, political and everyday symbolism, its ‘just’ 
share of posts in military, police and bureaucracy (Petersen 2002: 41-42). Adopting 
ethnic post-territorial regimes that could reach out to all segments of the country’s 
major ethnic grouo was a part of the nationalizing efforts in these new states. All 
principled excuses, cushions and well-intentioned justifications aside, the politicised 
and highly salient nature of inter-ethnic relations in the countries of the region made 
ethnic selectivity a clearly legible message about who were ‘the real owners’ of a 
state. The importance of sending this message whenestablishing new states is nicely 
illustrated by the examples of Slovenia and Croatia, where citizenship laws, designed 
by their rightist governments, were included into the initial packages of acts 
establishing national independence (Medved 2010: 6; Ragazzi and Štiks 2010: 1). 
However, although the desire to nationalise new states was widely shared, the 
success of these efforts hinged on the underlying congruence of new states’ ethnic 
composition with the nationalizing policies of their political elites. (Table 5) 
 
Country (year) Initial regime Governing party bloc Major ethnicity  
Slovenia (1991) Ethnic post-territorial Anti-Communist 
Right  
88.3% 
Croatia (1991) Ethnic post-territorial Anti-Communist 
Right 
78.1% 
FR Yugoslavia8 (1996) Emigrant welcoming Ex-Communist Left 65.92% + 5% 
Macedonia (1992) Emigrant post-
territorial 
Ex-Communist Left 65.3% 
Moldova (1991) Restrictive Anti-Communist 
Right 
64.5% 
Table 5 
The process through which Macedonia ended up with an emigrant post-
territorialised regime illustrates how internal ethnic contestation actually works to 
influence the content of citizenship regimes. Macedonia adopted its initial citizenship 
regime at roughly the same time and in a very similar context to Slovenia and 
                                                 
8 FR Yugoslavia was a new state whose external selectivity had not been crucially shaped by the early 
nationalising drive. The specifics of FR Yugoslavia’s role as an external homeland were more 
important. For reasons of narrative convenience, I discuss it in the next sub-section. 
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Croatia. Still, unlike in those two, Macedonia’s external selectivity regime has been 
post-territorial but never overtly ethnically selective. The constitution adopted by   
Macedonia in November 1991 was clearly meant to establish Macedonia as national 
homeland of Macedonian people. This was stated in a   constitutional preamble, and 
was reflected in a later article that promises Macedonia will look after the status, 
rights and culture of “Macedonian people abroad, and of emigrants from 
Macedonia” (Article 49). However, ethnic composition on the ground was not 
favourable for Macedonia to be exclusively “owned” by ethnic Macedonians. In early 
January 1992 ethnic Albanians from Macedonia organised a separate referendum 
demanding broad territorial autonomy (Spaskovska 2010: 9). In the face of these 
inter-ethnic tensions, the citizenship law adopted in November 1992 dropped the 
explicit constitutional dualism between Macedonians abroad and emigrants from 
Macedonia. Instead, Macedonia went for emigrant post-territorialised selectivity, 
though one not very “deep” because only emigrants and their first generation 
descendants were eligible for easier naturalisation. 
Though this outcome has endured, that does not mean it was uncontested. 
Beside the major inter-ethnic line of contestation, it was also the subject of political 
debate. The trajectory of this debate shows both the importance and limitations of 
left-right political competition in the face of structural constraints stemming from 
demography. In parliamentary debates in 1992 representatives of the anti-communist 
right-wing party VMRO-DPMNE argued in favour of ethnic post-territorial external 
selectivity, while the slender ex-communist left majority, fearing internal and 
international consequences, settled for an emigrant post-territorial regime (Ragazzi 
and Balalovska 2010: 17-18). Since independence, VMRO-DPMNE has supported 
ethnicised selectivity, and has tried to symbolically and administratively reinterpret 
emigrant selectivity in this direction. However, this tendency has always been 
checked by the presence of ethnic Albanians that number about a quarter of the total 
population, by the continuous presence of their representatives in coalition 
governments, and especially by the move toward formalised consociation in the 
aftermath of the brief but violent ethnic conflict in 2001. In short, ethnic Albanians in 
Macedonia remained too numerous not to have a voice in Macedonian politics, one 
way or another. Macedonian emigrant post-territorial selectivity has been somewhat 
ethnicised in that it requires applicants to have some knowledge of the Macedonian 
language. Similarly, Macedonia excludes emigrants who emigrated to their kin-state 
from the possibility of facilitated naturalisation (Spaskovska 2010: 13). To some 
extent these provisions favour ethnic Macedonians with territorial origins in 
Macedonia, but stop short of outright ethnic selectivity that could open up such 
highly sensitive issues as the  history of Macedonians in eastern Bulgaria and 
northern Greece (Spaskovska 2010a: 18-19). 
The Moldovan case is similar to the Macedonian in having both the initial 
nationalising enthusiasm of the political elites representing the majority, and in 
having complex ethnic make-up of the population curbing this overambitious 
nationalising endeavour. The main difference is that the nationalising effort in 
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Moldova was not in the name of Moldovans as a distinct ethnic group, but in the 
name of Moldovans as a part of the Romanian nation. Popular mobilization and 
semi-competitive elections in the early 1990 brought into power a broad protest 
movement, parts of which were staunchly in favour of unification of ‘two Romanian 
states’. (King 2000: 147-160). However, the political situation got increasingly 
complex when it became evident that significant numbers of speakers of 
Romanian/Moldovan were opposing the Romanisation of independent Moldova, not 
to speak of the ‘reunification’. The first clashes in the Transnistrian region broke out 
in November 1990, and further escalated in the following months. These 
developments led to a more conciliatory politics on the part of segments of the 
government in Kishinev, and gave the impetus for a quite restrictive and ethnically 
neutral citizenship law in June 1991. This law both constitutionally and legally 
prohibited dual citizenship. This provision countered the Romanian post-territorial 
regime, but was also handy for countering the Russian offer of passports to former 
Soviet citizens (Gasca 2010: 4-5). 
Among the states that opted for ethnicised post-territorial regimes of 
selectivity, Croatia was the state with the lowest degree of ethnic homogeneity. The 
ethnicisation of citizenship and of other public spheres in Croatia in the early 1990s 
happened in the context of escalating ethnic conflict, and contributed further to its 
escalation. The Croatian ethnicised regime of external selectivity has survived partly 
due to the fact that this conflict ended in decisive Croatian military victory. That 
outcome substantially reduced the number of Serbs residing in Croatia. In the 1991 
census, ethnic Croats comprised 78% of population, as opposed to 89.6% in the 2001 
census. Simultaneously the Serb population shrunk from about 12% to 4.5%. This 
quick and violent change in ethnic make-up of the population moved Croatia into the 
zone where its ethnic post-territorial regime became much less likely to be 
challenged by internal minorities. In an unusual way, the Croatian case confirms my 
claim about the importance of ethnic demography for the politics of selecting by 
origin in the region. 
Since the Croatian competitive authoritarian political regime began to 
democratise in 2000, with the left-leaning coalition ousting right-wingers from 
power, administrative practice has also slightly reduced the ethnic exclusivity of its 
external selectivity. These changes were particularly important for the refugee Serbs 
who were previously citizens of Croatia within Socialist Yugoslavia. After 2000 it 
became much easier for them to reclaim their Croatian citizenship based on the 
principle of legal continuity. More relevantly for my focus on selectivity in 
naturalisation procedures, this political and administrative realignment also enabled 
the non-resident descendants of Croatian citizens of Serb origin to become Croatian 
citizens if they wished to. The situation is very different from the one existing before 
2000 when administrative practice under the same legislation often prevented the 
naturalisation of Serbs with familial connections to Croatia. Nevertheless, applicants 
of Croatian ethnicity remained privileged because they can be naturalised even if 
they or their ancestors are not emigrants from the territory of Croatia. (Raggazi and 
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Štiks 2010: 8-12). Thus, the Croatian regime of external selectivity has in the post-2000 
period remained of positive ethnicised type, while discriminatory administrative 
practices in the 1990s contained elements of negative ethnic selectivity (Štiks 2010: 
1632). 
 
3.2. First Wave: Reluctant Veterans, Irredentist Opportunities and Economic Constraints 
 
If new states were prone to nationalizing efforts in the post-communist era, states 
that were perpetuating the traditions of already existing nation-states were less likely 
to experience a strong internal drive to radically alter their citizenship regimes. In 
these old nation-states the issue of ethnic ownership was never under much doubt in 
the previous communist decades, so the post-communist reaction has been relatively 
milder. For those states positive ethnic selectivity had become the norm already in 
the early 1990s. Still, this selectivity sometimes took a welcoming, and sometimes 
post-territorial form. Old nation-states were perhaps expected to act as protective 
‘external national homelands’ for their ethnic kin in neighbouring countries, and to 
more uniformly reach for the ethnic post-territorial type. They were certainly not 
ignoring their “stranded” co-ethnics. For instance, the first Hungarian post-
communist Prime Minister Jozsef Antall famously declared himself ‘spiritual’ Prime 
Minister of 15 million Hungarians, and was known for tormenting his diplomatic 
guests with long historical lectures (Raine 2005). Nevertheless, it appears that 
something more was needed to push old states into translating even keen interest for 
trans-border co-ethnics into post-territorial selectivity. Since this kind of selectivity 
primarily targets co-ethnics that remain residents of foreign countries, states are 
mindful of the international repercussions of their policies. Again, left-right political 
competition seems to play some role, at least in shaping how international 
opportunities were perceived, but this role was again constrained in the first wave of 
post-communist citizenship reforms (Table 6). 
 
Country (year) External selectivity 
regime 
Governing party bloc Major ethnicity 
Albania (1992) Ethnic post-territorial Anti-Communist Right 95% 
Albania (1998) Ethnic welcoming Ex-Communist Left 95% 
Hungary (1993) Ethnic welcoming Anti-Communist Right 93,2% 
Romania (1990, 
1991) 
Ethnic post-territorial Ex-Communist Left 89.5% 
Bulgaria (1991, 
constitution) 
Ethnic welcoming Caretaker government 
supported by Left and 
Right 
85.7% 
Bulgaria (1998, law) Ethnic welcoming Anti-Communist Right 85.7% 
Table 6 
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How perceived international opening could induce a ethnic post-territorial 
regime is well-illustrated by the case of Romania. In May 1990, mere ten days before 
the first competitive elections, the interim government of the National Salvation 
Front (NSF) issued Decree-Law no. 137, in which it removed residence requirements 
for reacquisition of citizenship for people who escaped Ceausescu’s regime (Iordachi 
2010: 9-10). Simultaneously, the political situation in Moldova, at least for several 
crucial months, seemed to go in a direction favourable to pro-Romanian unionist 
political forces. In this period of mass mobilisation, with the collapse of communism, 
a severe crisis of Soviet federation, and the unification of two Germanies already 
underway, it indeed appeared far from impossible that Moldova and Romania 
would form a political union. Extension of post-territorial citizenship was a 
convenient way to support pro-Romanian parts of the Moldovan political elite. In 
addition, ex-communists who emerged quite late in the day to take over the 
leadership of Romanian revolution could have used the boost in popularity from 
supporting this unification. In March 1991 NSF held its national convention under a 
map depicting Moldova as a part of resurrected Greater Romania (King 2000: 149-
150). In the same month, the NSF-dominated parliament revised the rules governing 
reacquisition of citizenship to include also former citizens, and their descendants, 
living in territories once belonging to the interwar Romanian state (Iordachi 2010: 10-
11). The combination of a sense of historical opportunity to redeem a perceived 
territorial injustice, and politicking within Romania provided an impetus for 
extending citizenship to Romanian-speakers in Moldova and in parts of present-day 
Ukraine. Because of its origin in this early irredentist opportunity, Romanian 
selectivity remained of my extraterritorial culture-specific sub-type. 
In the absence of these specific opportunities, old nation-states were more 
reluctant to introduce post-territorial ethnic selectivity. Whatever the opinion about 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 in some quarters in Hungary and Bulgaria, these 
treaties were certainly not internationally delegitimized in the same way as the Nazi-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 that created the present-day borders between 
Romania and Moldova. Thus, Bulgaria and Hungary both made some relatively mild 
concessions to nationalising practices in their external selectivity regimes. Under its 
anti-communist right-wing government in the early 1990s, Hungary made bigger 
concessions by reducing the required residence for naturalisation of ethnic 
Hungarians from eight years to effectively only one year (Section 4 of the Act LV of 
1993 on Hungarian Citizenship). Bulgaria, where Left and Right retained an unstable 
balance of power immediately after the collapse of communism, adopted just such a 
general constitutional provision saying that naturalisation of ethnic Bulgarians 
should be favoured in future citizenship law (Smilov and Jileva 2010: 9). This 
constitutional clause was expanded only in 1998 when the law adopted by the centre-
right reformist government allowed ethnic Bulgarians to be naturalised after three 
years of permanent residence in Bulgaria. Five years of continuous living in Bulgaria 
was required to get permanent residency. Thus, effectively ethnic Bulgarians had to 
move to Bulgaria and spend 8 years living there before they could be naturalised, as 
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compared to the10 years effectively required of non-Bulgarians (Smilov and Jileva 
2010: 12-13). 
An interesting case is FR Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro), 
which was technically a new state, but one where the strong and early nationalising 
drive had not left its imprint on external selectivity. Instead, the complex position of 
FR Yugoslavia in the process of the violent dissolution of former socialist Yugoslavia 
meant that for the duration of the Yugoslav wars, the adoption of new citizenship 
rules had to be postponed. In the early 1990s, despite occasional rifts with the 
leadership of Serb statelets in Croatia and Bosnia, FR Yugoslavia supported them 
strongly. However, FR Yugoslavia also had strong reasons to refrain from making a 
grand official proclamation of its role. After the breakaway Yugoslav republics were 
internationally recognised, any official involvement from FR Yugoslavia would have 
constituted an act of international aggression. Far from being tempted to extend 
citizenship to Serbs outside of Serbia as a justification for its involvement, the 
Yugoslav leadership was instead vigorously denying its involvement in the wars. 
Recently disclosed transcripts from the closed meetings of highest military and 
political leaders in the early 1990s confirm that they were seriously concerned about 
maintaining this official line (e-Novine: online). 
Only in 1996, a year after the wars ended, was FR Yugoslavia able to amend 
the citizenship law it inherited from the communist period. One of the outcomes of 
those wars was that the smaller namesake of the former Yugoslavia received more 
than 500,000 Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. If the new selectivity regime had 
been based on ethnic criteria, all these refugees would have easily qualified for 
citizenship. Despite putative ethnic solidarity, this option was not favoured by the 
Yugoslav government because of the potential economic costs involved, because the 
government in Belgrade wanted to facilitate the return of refugees to areas they had 
fled, and because of ill-conceived plans to resettle Serb refugees in Kosovo (Rava 
2010: 10-12). Additional support for the claim that potential overload of refugee 
applications significantly shaped the selectivity regime in 1996 can be found in the 
fact that the law left several loopholes for economic emigrants to avoid renunciation 
of other citizenships upon repatriation. The supposedly general insistence on 
renunciation was diligently enforced only for refugee applicants (Čok 1996, Lilić et al 
2001: 3-4). 
The situation with refugees influencing the trajectory of an external selectivity 
regime was repeated in 1998 in Albania. As expected for an old state with a very 
homogenous ethnic structure, the post-communist selectivity regime of Albania was 
quickly ethnicised. Only four months after Sali Berisha’s right-wing anti-communist 
party won the national elections in 1992, Berisha himself used a presidential decree to 
set-up new citizenship regulations. This adopted selectivity regime belonged to my 
ethnic post-territorial type, though the actual regulations were rather short and 
ambiguous about the residence requirement, and they left a lot of discretion to the 
Office of the President. I have argued that for an old nation-state to reach for post-
territorial variation in the early 1990s a credible irredentist opportunity should have 
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been perceived by the state leaders. In the early 1990s Yugoslavia was collapsing, and 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and in western Macedonia had already held separate 
referendums calling for more self-rule. On the other hand, the violent break-up of 
socialist Yugoslavia was also already well underway. If for no other reason than for 
the fear of conflict spilling over, the Albanian government supported the more 
daring demands of its ethnic kin, albeit mostly verbally, and in a lukewarm manner 
(Wolf 2005: 83). It is difficult to determine how the perception of this situation 
evolved in Tirana, which was at the time preoccupied with internal social and 
political disturbances. However, the overall rate of naturalisation remained low as 
the ensuing years in Albania were marked more by strong economic emigration 
(Krasniqi 2010b: 9-10). 
These disorderly years culminated in 1997 in the implosion of the state 
administration under pressure from the large-scale unrest triggered by the collapse 
of pyramid financial schemes. Berisha’s rightist party was heavily defeated in 1997 
snap elections, while the new, leftist government faced the daunting task of 
rebuilding state structures. In the spring of 1998 Albania started receiving ethnic 
Albanian refugees from Kosovo where armed conflict had been rapidly escalating. 
Albania faced a very real possibility – soon to become a reality – of having to receive 
hundreds of thousands more refugees. Under the 1992 selectivity regime the vast 
majority of them could relatively easily obtain Albanian citizenship. In order to avoid 
this probably unmanageable scenario, in August 1998 the government pushed 
through parliament a citizenship law reinstating the residence requirement for 
naturalisation of ‘people of Albanian origin’. Under the new regulations they needed 
to meet all the standard and relatively burdensome requirements, except that they 
could be naturalised after three, instead of five years of legal residence. These 
amendments shifted post-territorial selectivity regime to a very mild version of the 
ethnic welcoming type (Krasniqi 2010b: 11-12). 
 
3.3. Places in Between: Divided we Stand 
 
As can be seen from the cases of Macedonia and Moldova, in the early days of post-
communism, the causal mechanisms through which a complex demographic picture 
inhibits the ethnicisation of external selectivity has been different forms of peaceful 
and violent inter-ethnic contestations. Given the demographic structure and recent 
history of Bosnia and Montenegro, it is unsurprising to see both of those countries 
opting for non-ethnicised external selectivity. Somewhat unexpectedly Kosovo, 
despite its clear ethnic majority, also has an emigrant external selectivity regime. This 
should be interpreted in view of Kosovo’s recent history, in which it has been an 
ethnically divided polity that descended into warfare. Reacting to this legacy, the 
international community – similarly to its role in Bosnia – became strongly involved 
in post-conflict institutional design and the day-to-day governance in Kosovo. In 
both cases this involvement helped to promote non-ethnicised regimes of external 
selectivity, though international involvement decisively altered the expected 
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selectivity regime only in the case of Kosovo. Throughout the post-communist years 
ethnically divided states remained confined to non-ethnicised selectivity regimes, 
even though these regimes were rarely the first choices of their political elites. (Table 
7) 
 
Country (year) Initial regime Governing party bloc Major ethnicity  
Moldova (1991) Restrictive Anti-Communist Right 64.5% 
Macedonia (1992) Emigrant post-
territorial 
Ex-Communist Left 65.3% 
Bosnia (1997, 
decision) 
Emigrant (refugee) 9 
welcoming 
Imposed by the 
International High 
Representative 
43.5%10 
Bosnia (1999, law) Emigrant (refugee)9 
welcoming 
Coalition of nationalist 
rightist parties 
43.5% 
Montenegro (199911, 
2007) 
Emigrant welcoming Pro-independence parties 43% 
Moldova (2003) Emigrant post-
territorial 
Left 69.6% 
Kosovo (2008) Emigrant (refugee)9 
post-territorial 
ICO-EUSR, ex-political 
wing of UCK 
88% 
Table 7 
Bosnia had already been internationally recognized in 1992, but during the 
war the government of the Republic of Srpska and the government in Sarajevo 
enacted separate citizenship regimes. Regulations governing naturalisation of 
foreigners in the Serb part of the country were unambiguously ethnic, post-
territorial. Rules adopted in late 1992, in the midst of the war, by the rump 
presidency of pre-war Bosnia were ethnically neutral but relatively restrictive 
regarding external selectivity (Sarajlić 2010: 8-11). The first post-war citizenship rules, 
imposed by the international community’s High Representative, annulled all 
previous regulations. New rules, translated into law two years later, provided for 
facilitated repatriation of returning refugees and emigrants, and their descendants, 
up to the second generation. Whereas ordinary applicants have to live in Bosnia for 8 
years before qualifying for citizenship, Bosnian returnees – whether they escaped the 
war or emigrated earlier or later due to economic circumstances – receive citizenship 
                                                 
9 Kosovo and Bosnia, being the cases with the most difficult post-conflict legacy, have introduced 
selectivity regimes that belong to my emigrant welcoming type, but that are also (or primarily) used 
by returning war refugees. Still, in both cases the wording of the legislation makes it clear that the 
intention was to use the same criteria for regular – both pre- and post-war – returning emigrants. 
10 According to the last census conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 when Bosnia was still 
part of the former Yugoslavia, there were 43.5% Bosniaks (Muslims), 31% Serbs and 17% Croats. It is 
expected that the figures have shifted in favour of Bosniaks over the last 20 years so that the 
groupthese days accounts for about half of the population. 
11 Montenegro and Serbia were two republics of the same state until May 2006, but since 1997 in the 
sphere of citizenship, as in many other spheres, Montenegro has acted very much independently. 
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immediately upon repatriation, and without having to renounce other citizenships 
(Article 12 of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajlić 2010: 12-
13). These provisions make Bosnia a clear case of a welcoming regime, though one 
not primarily oriented toward economic emigrants, but which aims to facilitate the 
return of numerous war refugees scattered around the globe. Apart from this 
welcoming selectivity, the repeated interventions of international actors to delay 
enforcement of the legal clauses prohibiting dual citizenship enabled many Bosnian 
refugees and emigrants to hold Bosnian citizenship, and even to pass it through ius 
sanguinis to their descendants. Still, the continuation of such practices is conditional 
on reaching inter-ethnic consensus, or perhaps on another fiat of international 
administration (SEtimes [online]a). 
Kosovo is also a post-conflict case where international actors were heavily 
involved in designing the citizenship regime. The law on citizenship was adopted 
with the support of all ethnic Albanian parties in Kosovo as part of an independence 
package in February 2008 (Krasniqi 2010a: 12-13). Obvious effort has been made to 
stress that the Kosovo diaspora is defined in an inclusive manner, and applicants are 
asked to have elementary knowledge of either Albanian or Serbian. Kosovo is a 
partial exemption to my theory because it does have a clear ethnic majority, but the 
international community has been safeguarding the avenues through which ethnic 
Serbs, despite their relative numerical disadvantage, could in future have a voice in 
Kosovar politics. Inclusivity of external selectivity is one of those avenues. If and 
when non-resident ethnic Serbs with territorial origins in Kosovo – many of whom 
had to flee from Kosovo in 1999 – should begin to apply for Kosovan passports, it 
will be interesting to see how the clear ethnic dominance of ethnic Albanians and 
history of strong inter-ethnic antagonism will square with the current regime of 
selectivity. A crucial factor for the sustainability of this inclusive citizenship regime 
will be the ability of consociational mechanisms in Kosovo’s internationally designed 
constitution (Marko 2009) to secure a continuous political voice for Serbs, when and 
if they start participating in Kosovo’s politics in greater numbers. 
Because the Montenegrin citizenship law adopted in 2007 does somewhat 
reduce the residence requirement for emigrants and their descendants, it qualifies as 
emigrant welcoming, but only in a very limited sense. The main limitation comes 
from rejection of dual citizenship, except on the basis of rare bilateral agreements 
(Dzankic 2010: 19). This rejection is conditioned by the fears of the Montenegrin 
ruling party that even a moderate increase in the number of dual citizens with pro-
Serb inclinations could alter electoral results, or even endanger the recently 
established independence of Montenegro (Džankić 2010: 11). The electorate in the 
country has been almost evenly split for years; competing Montenegrin and Serb 
nation-building projects were a major part in this division.  
All four ethnically divided states, and partially recognised Kosovo, are also 
countries where a significant part, or even majority of population, is the target group 
of neighbours’ kin-policies. With the partial exception of Montenegro, the four other 
cases have no modern tradition of independent statehood that precedes the 
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communist period. Historically they have been places-in-between where the modern 
national idea was planted comparatively late, and where neighbouring state- and 
nation-building projects competed (and where they to an extent still compete). With 
the exception of Albania’s relation to Kosovo, and FRY/Serbia relations to Bosnia 
before 2004, these kin-state policies by bigger “brotherly” nations included the 
extension of ethnic post-territorial citizenship. Wherever that is the case, the 
extension of citizenship is seen by at least some segments of the political elites in the 
targeted state as a sort of “hostile takeover” bid. In response to this, Moldova in the 
1990s, and Montenegro since 2007, took steps to counter the ethnic post-territorial 
regimes of their neighbours by excluding the possibility of dual citizenship except on 
the basis of rare bilateral agreements. Because Albania does not offer ethnic 
citizenship on a non-residential basis, Kosovo has freely opted for tolerating dual 
citizenship and for emigrant post-territorial selectivity. As in Bosnia, this regime is 
aimed at war refugees, but also at Kosovo’s older and politically and economically 
influential ethnic Albanian diaspora. Macedonia also kept its emigrant post-
territorial regime. The number of Macedonians using the possibility to acquire 
Bulgarian passports – though not insignificant – has remained relatively small 
(Smilov and Jileva 2010: 15), and has not prompted strong protective measures 
against ‘hostile takeover’. 
Bosnian post-war regulations contain a similar clause on restriction of dual 
citizenship; until recently a bilateral agreement regulating dual citizenship had been 
concluded only with Sweden and Serbia. The agreement with Serbia was originally 
signed with FR Yugoslavia in 2002, in the period before Belgrade shifted to an ethnic 
post-territorial selectivity regime. Moreover, the agreement stipulated that access to 
second citizenship is conditional on permanently residing in the naturalising country 
for three years (article 1). In other words, the agreement took steps to protect Bosnia 
from ‘hostile takeover’. After Serbia switched to an ethnic-post territorial mode of 
selective naturalisation in 2004, there was an attempt by Bosniak politicians to cancel 
the agreement in 2007. However, Bosnian consociational institutions guarantee that it 
can be cancelled only in the highly unlikely scenario in which representatives of all 
three constituent ethnicities do not object to the motion. 
Rejection of dual citizenship goes against the established global trend of 
greater tolerance for the practice, and sits uncomfortably with the importance of 
remittances in the poorer economies of the region (World Bank 2006: 59). Moreover, 
it is difficult for states to actually control whether its citizens are taking up other 
citizenships. This sometimes created de facto conditions that are very different from 
those written in laws. For instance, due to the precarious economic situation in 
Moldova, an unusually high percentage of citizens emigrated; many took up foreign 
passports, most of them Romanian passports, but also Russian, Bulgarian and others 
(Novinite [online]). Eventually, in the early 2000s, even the Moldovan leftist pro-
independence ruling party was persuaded to accept the situation. In a burdensome 
amending process, Moldova has since 2003 accepted an indirect and limited form of 
dual citizenship (Gasca 2010: 4-5). Similarly, squabbling Bosnian ethnic elites in 2011 
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finally came to an agreement to ratify the bilateral treaty on dual citizenship with 
Croatia (SEEbiz [online]). Over the years, it is estimated that more than 500,000 
Bosnian citizens took Croatian citizenship. Not all of those were ethnic Croats, as 
many non-Croats in western Bosnia also found ways to claim Croatian passports, 
which were useful for travel and for economic purposes (Sarajlić 2010: 19). 
 
3.4. Second Wave: Party Politics as Usual 
 
After 2000 reforms in external selectivity regimes mostly entailed ethnicisation and 
removal of residence requirements (though one apparent exception is Moldova, I 
have already discussed how the Moldovan shift of 2003 is of completely different 
kind). This leaves the Romania’s 2001-2007 suspension of post-territorial aspects of 
its ethnic selectivity as the only partial exemption to the trend witnessed in Bulgaria, 
Serbia and Hungary. In these three cases, and in the case of the Romanian swing 
back to post-territorial ethnic selectivity in 2007, the removal of residency 
requirements for naturalisation of co-ethnics was adopted during the reign of rightist 
parties (Table 8). Even though the political left in neither of these countries initiated 
regime shifts, their reactions to these shifts differed. In Bulgaria and Serbia, after 
being proposed from the right, these moves garnered some support from the left as 
well. The left was more vocally opposed in Romania and in Hungary. However, only 
Romanian leftists were able to alter the regime after Romania faced a potential 
naturalisation overload in 2001. In all these countries the extension of citizenship and 
voting rights to non-resident co-ethnics were seen as electoral ploys of the rightist 
parties posed to garner most of the external votes, but also to build their internal 
legitimacy as parties most concerned for the fate of the nation.  
 
Post-2000 shifts 
(year) 
Regime shift Governing 
party bloc 
Major 
ethnicity 
Bulgaria (2001) Ethnic welcoming  Ethnic post-territorial Right 83.9% 
Romania (2001) Ethnic post-territorial  Ethnic welcoming Left 89.5% 
Moldova (2003) Restrictive  Emigrant post-territorial Left 69.6% 
Serbia (2004) Emigrant welcoming  Ethnic post-territorial Right 82.9% 
Romania 2007) Ethnic welcoming  Ethnic post-territorial Right 89.5% 
Hungary (2010) Ethnic welcoming  Ethnic post-territorial Right 94.4% 
Table 8 
However, right-wing governments in the same countries were in power both 
before and after this resurgence of interest in citizenship reform. Is it possible to 
move beyond the idiosyncrasies of national legislative processes to explain the 
timing of these external selectivity reforms? Their clustered timing and very similar 
thrust suggest that it is not just a mere coincidence of mutually independent cases. 
Citizenship studies have so far dealt with issues of reform timing when explaining 
the persistence of and changes to immigrant naturalisation rules in Western Europe. 
One suggestion has been that right-wing mobilisation outside of mainstream centre-
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right parties is needed in order to put migration issues on the legislative table, and to 
pressure mainstream parties into taking a more nativist attitude (Howard 2006: 449-
451). 
In the early 2000s Hungary saw some of this right-wing anti-mainstream 
mobilization in favour of extending citizenship to all trans-border ethnic Hungarians. 
The World Federation of Hungarians (a diaspora forum) in particular campaigned 
for post-territorialisation of citizenship as the EU accession of Hungary approached 
and threatened to leave cross-border ethnic Hungarians outside of ‘the fortress 
Europe’. In response to this campaign the rightist government of Fidesz in 2001 
drafted a controversial Status law, which extended a substantial portion of quasi-
citizenship rights to ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring states, but refrained from 
post-territorialising citizenship. The proposal put forward by the Federation was at 
the time deemed unrealistic and risky. However, the halfway solution presented by 
the Status law still outraged the governments of neighbouring countries, and failed 
to meet the expectations of the Federation and its supporters. After the most 
controversial provisions of the Status law were curbed in 2003 under a new left-wing 
government, the Federation started a new campaign to force a referendum on 
extending full scale ethnic post-territorial citizenship. Only after considerable 
hesitation did Fidesz accept the proposal.12 Left-wingers in power opposed it mainly 
on the grounds of the economic costs it would entail for resident Hungarian citizens. 
The proposal was defeated in December 2004 after the government called for a 
boycott of the referendum in order to reduce participation below the constitutionally 
required threshold (Kovacs and Toth 2010: 11-12). However, the call for post-
territorialisation of citizenship became a prominent feature of Fidesz’s platform in 
the following years. Only after a decade of struggle was the citizenship regime of 
Hungary finally post-territorialised once Fidesz returned to power in a landslide 
victory in the 2010 elections. It was a sign of the growing legitimacy of post-territorial 
citizenship in the region that only the Slovakian government strongly objected, 
whereas in the early 2000s Bucharest and Belgrade both joined Bratislava in vocally 
criticising the mere quasi-citizenship entailed in the Status law (Bauböck 2010; EUDO 
[online]). 
Unlike in Hungary, the other two cases of right-wing sponsored citizenship 
regime shifts saw no similar bottom up mobilization in favour of reform. Party and 
parliamentary debates in Bulgaria in 2001 and in Serbia in 2004 were not particularly 
fierce. Notably, by 2004 Serbia had already lost effective control of Kosovo, leaving 
ethnic Serbs the clear majority (83%) of the population. When in 2003 FR Yugoslavia 
was transformed into the much looser State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
Serbian legislators first gained exclusive legal jurisdiction to direct citizenship 
policies. Thus, the earlier obstacles to ethnicisation of selectivity regime disappeared. 
                                                 
12 For an exhaustive analysis of different modes of Hungary’s engagement with trans-border kin-
communities see Waterbury 2010. For the reasons leading Fidesz to shift its position and start 
supporting ethnic post-territorial selectivity, see pp. 124-126. 
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When Bulgaria and Serbia opted for post-territorial regimes, many regional states 
had already adopted similar regimes of external selectivity, while internationally 
prominent contestations were already underway in Hungary, and some West 
European countries such as Italy moved in a similar direction (Zincone and Basili 
2010: 11). Post-territorial citizenship appeared as a regional pattern that provided a 
relatively clear blueprint to be followed, and internationally justifiable at least on 
grounds of reciprocity. 
This regional trend toward ethnic post-territorial external selectivity has not 
included Albania so far. The 1998 citizenship law established an ethnic welcoming 
regime in a very mild form. Albanian citizenship law also contains an exceptional 
naturalisation clause, which just like in the Slovenian case includes the most 
ambiguous wording about ‘national interest’ being sufficient reason for 
naturalisation. In Slovenia this clause has for years served as a vehicle for fast-
tracking applicants of Slovene ethnicity regardless of their place of residence or 
actual connection to Slovenia (Medved 2010: 15). In Albania, however, the clause has 
never been used for this sort of blanket naturalisation of co-ethnics (Krasniqi 2010b: 
14). If Kosovo remains on the Schengen black list, and Albania remains on the white 
list, the increased interest of Kosovo ethnic Albanians would certainly put the 
Albanian citizenship regime to the test. Sali Berisha, serving again as Prime Minister, 
touted in February 2012 the idea of shifting to outright ethnic post-territorial 
selectivity (SETimes [online]b).  
Another partial exemption to the regional post-2000 trend has been the 
Romanian swing between an ethnic post-territorial and ethnic welcoming regime in 
2001, and back again in 2007. In 2001 Romanian citizens were granted visa-free travel 
within the Schengen zone. This led to a vast increase in the number of naturalisation 
applicants from Moldova, amounting to 300 applications a day according to official 
Romanian figures. This created an overload in the literal sense since it was 
impossible for the five-member commission to review all these cases. More 
importantly, the overload was political because several EU agencies and member 
states voiced strong concern that unwanted immigrants could find an easy way into 
the Schengen zone through Romania. Under these conditions the Romanian leftist 
government adopted an emergency ordinance to temporally suspend naturalisation 
procedures. Eventually, in late 2003, the government found an efficient way to 
reduce demand for citizenship by creating new administrative and legal obstacles to 
naturalisation of non-residents. This situation survived the change to a rightist 
government in 2004, and persisted until 2007 when Romania – already an EU 
member – returned to the ethnic post-territorial type. The regime has been further 
relaxed in the following years, not least in 2009 as a means of showing support for 
pro-EU (and pro-Romanian) protests in Moldova against the then ruling pro-
independence left party in Moldova (Iordachi 2010: 14-18). 
 
 
 
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/20 
 
27 
4. Conclusion: Toward a Comprehensive Explanation of a Narrow Field 
 
The trajectory of the Romanian case in the last decade also illustrates that the causal 
factors emphasised in this paper – ethnic demography, variations in international 
opportunity structure, economic and logistical costs of implementing a particular 
regime, mass political mobilization, and left-right party competition - retained some 
importance throughout the observed period. However, their relative weight varies, 
and I have argued that it varies between (a) old nation-states prone to act as external 
national homelands, newly emerging nationalizing states, and ethnically divided 
states; and temporally between (b) the early and the later post-communist years 
(Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Default positions of states in different types of political contexts (blocks), and dominant causes of 
within-type variations (arrows) 
Against the backdrop of highly politicised ethnic relations in the region, ethnic 
structure has been a consistently important factor in both periods, with ethnically 
divided states not being able to ethnicise their selectivity regimes due to strong 
opposition from non-core groups in the country. Especially in the unstable early 
years of post-communism, political (often right-wing) elites in these divided states, 
tried to ignore the importance of ethnic composition. These attempts quickly proved 
abortive in all cases apart from the borderline case of ethnic division which was 
Croatia in the early 1990s. Even here, the persistence of the selectivity regime was 
preceded by a substantial reduction in the number of ethnic Serbs residing in Croatia. 
One substitute for ethnicisation sometimes available to a divided state was to remove 
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residence criteria while defining the target group mostly on the basis of territorial 
origin. This was the route taken by Macedonia, Kosovo, and (more cautiously) by 
Moldova in 2003. However this alternative has been available only if divided states 
were not also prominent targets of other states’ selectivity. If they were, the common 
countering move – seen in Bosnia, Montenegro and in Moldova before 2003 – has 
been for divided states to try to restrict instances of dual citizenship. In Bosnia 
additional international interventions created space for retention of dual citizenship 
for non-resident refugees and emigrants, albeit not through naturalisation, but 
through transfer of citizenship ius sanguinis abroad. 
More ethnically homogenous states of the region have generally introduced 
ethnic post-territorial selectivity regimes. Newly emerging states with relatively high 
degrees of ethnic homogeneity (such as Slovenia and to some extent Croatia) did so 
in the early years of post-communism within the broader wave of nationalizing the 
public sphere. During these rare historical opportunities to break away from the 
existing political units, selectivity reforms were part of a move to establish the 
credentials of new states as national homelands for a particular ethnicity. For the old 
nation-states of the region (such as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), the demise of 
communism was in many ways a dramatic transformation, but the re-affirmation of 
the ethnic hierarchy was usually not as contentious. Unlike the newly emerging 
states, old nation-states were not pressed to justify their independent existence, while 
internal ethnic hierarchies were more or less known even during the communist 
period. Thus, old nation-states in the region have usually refrained from post-
territorial forms of ethnic selectivity in the early years of post-communism, unless 
prompted by an irredentist opportunity. However, in the 2000s – with the notable 
exception of Albania – all nation-states followed suit when their right-wing parties 
engineered the removal of residence requirements for naturalisation of co-ethnics.  
In the post-2000 period left-right party competition, and emulation of a 
broader sub-current of ethnicisation of citizenship, account more consistently for the 
moves toward ethnic post-territorial external selectivity in Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Serbia. Once introduced ethnic post-territorial regimes of selectivity have been 
relatively stable. Under conditions of overload caused by a rapid increase in the 
number of citizenship applications, left-wing governments have been motivated and 
able to reinsert the residence clauses for co-ethnics. In these conditions arguments 
about the economic and logistical costs of positive ethnic selectivity have been 
persuasive. These extraordinary circumstances reversed established or otherwise 
expected ethnic post-territorial regimes of selectivity in FR Yugoslavia in 1996, in 
Albania in 1998, and in Romania in 2001. 
If my claims are correct, they have several theoretical implications. They 
confirm and extend the geographic scope of Shevel’s (2009) finding that strong 
internal identity divisions paradoxically tend to produce non-ethnicised citizenship 
rules. I also build on this argument by showing how the interaction between several 
clustered selectivity regimes helps to explain variations between welcoming and 
post-territorial types of non-ethnicised selectivity regimes. Similarly, I show that 
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direct international administrative involvement tends to reinforce this logic of 
divided polities, but that it also might have some leverage in imposing non-
ethnicised regimes, even when demographic divisions grow less pronounced. My 
arguments also confirm Štiks (2010) claim that most post-communist countries 
experienced early nationalizing trends in their citizenship regimes, but by 
distinguishing between ethnically divided states, and emerging and old nation-states 
I also show why nationalizing trends differently impacted the narrower sphere of 
external selectivity regimes. Finally, I argue that the post-2000 pattern of politics of 
selecting by origin in the region broadly follows the party-driven logic found in some 
states in Western Europe (Joppke 2003, 2010, Howard 2006), and the logic Waterbury 
(2010) identifies in Hungary. However, Waterbury’s strong focus on temporal 
variations within this single case does not allow her to determine the conditions 
under which party-driven logic is constrained or overridden. As I argue, this is 
foremost the case with constraints of complex ethnic demography, and in the periods 
of ‘thickened history’ when extraordinary political opportunities arise. 
While the validity of these claims need further testing, primarily through 
more detailed process tracing that can more rigorously confirm or reject alternative 
hypotheses, my goal in this paper has been to demonstrate their initial plausibility, 
and to demonstrate the promise they hold for reconciliation and advancement of 
several explanatory approaches present in the citizenship literature. Hopefully this 
paper will encourage further carefully geo-historically contextualised research into 
variations in external selectivity regimes, as well as in the other conceptually 
disaggregated segments of overall citizenship configurations. 
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Appendix 
 
WELCOMING – POST-TERRITORIAL CONTINUUM 
 
Cases are coded as mildly welcoming if: 
1. Targeted group is required to reside in the territory of a state and to do so for 
more than half of the period required in standard naturalisation 
or 
2. Targeted group is required to effectively renounce other citizenships 
Exceptionally, if all the groups are required to reside equal time, and to renounce 
other citizenships the case is coded as restrictive. 
 
Cases are coded as very welcoming if: 
1. Targeted group is required to reside in the territory of a state, but for half or 
less than half of the period required in standard naturalisation 
and 
2. Targeted group is not required to effectively renounce other citizenships. 
 
Cases are coded as partially post-territorial if: 
1. Residence requirement is waived for emigrants and first generation 
descendants 
 
Cases are coded as fully post-territorial if: 
1. Residence requirement is waived for emigrants and descendants of second 
generation and beyond 
 
ETHNIC - EMIGRANT CONTINUUM 
 
Cases are coded as fully ethnicised if: 
1. Targeted group is required to prove hard cultural linkages to major ethnicity 
(hard linkages – proving what you “are”) 
a. Belonging to the major national church 
b. Belonging to ethnic diaspora organisations 
c. Having the appropriate name 
d. Have eligible ancestors who satisfy at least one of the above 
e. Etc. 
Cases are coded as extraterritorial culture-specific 
1. Targeted group is only required to prove soft cultural linkages to major 
ethnicity (soft linkages – proving what you “can”). 
a. Speak language 
b. Sign loyalty pledge 
c. Be accustomed with legal and political system 
d. Etc. 
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And 
2. Applicants are required to show that they have ancestors who were citizens at 
the time, and in the territories, in which state expects to find most co-ethnics 
among former citizens 
 
Cases are coded as emigrant culture-specific if: 
1. Targeted group is required to prove territorial linkage to the present day 
territory of a country 
 And  
2. Targeted group is required to prove some soft cultural linkages 
 
Cases are coded as pure emigrant if: 
1. Target group is required to prove territorial linkage to the present day 
territory of a country 
 
CODING RESULTS 
 
See the next page. 
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Country (Year) Regime Type No residence 
reduction
Residence 
reduction <1/2
Dual citizenship in 
facilitated 
naturaliation
Residence 
reduction =/>1/2
Subset of co- 
ethnics
Emigrants, +1 All co-ethnics Emigrants, 2+ Hard cultural 
linkages
Soft linkages/ 
former 
teritories
soft linkages/ 
current territory
Territorial 
linkages
Albania (1992) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
Albania (1998) Ethnic welcoming x Y x x
Bosnia (1997, 1999) Emigrant welcoming
N, billateral 
agreements x x x
Bulgaria (1991, 
1998) Ethnic welcoming x Y x x
Bulgaria (2001) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
Croatia (1991) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
Hungary (1993) Ethnic welcoming Y x x x
Hungary (2010) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
Kosovo (2008) Emigrant post-territorial Y x x x
Macedonia (1992) Emigrant post-territorial Y x x x
Moldova (1991)
Restrictive x
N, billateral 
agreements
Moldova (2003) Emigrant welcoming Y x x
Montenegro (1999, 
2007) Emigrant welcoming
N, billateral 
agreements x x x
Romania (1991) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
Romania (2001/3) Ethnic welcoming Y x x x
Romania (2007) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
Serbia (2004) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
Slovenia (1991) Ethnic post-territorial Y x x
FR Yugoslavia  
(1996) Emigrant welcoming
Y, but only for 
repatriation of 
emigrants x x x  
 
 
 
 
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/20                         33 
 
 
Bibliography 
Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship, 1993, http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/HUN%20Act%20LV%20of%201993%20%28as%20of
%20Jan%202009%2C%20English%29.pdf. 
Agreement on dual citizenship between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, 2003, http://www.vladars.net/sr-sp-
cyrl/vlada/ministarstva/muls/Documents/ уговор%20о%20двојном%20 
држављанству%20између%20бих%20и%20савезне%20републике%20 
југославије.pdf. 
Bauböck, Rainer, (2007) ‘Stakeholder citizenship and transnational political 
participation: A normative evaluation of external voting.’ Fordham Law Review 75 (5): 
2393-2447. 
Bauböck, Rainer (2010) „Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to 
respond to the Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-tat”, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2010/75. 
Beissinger, Mark R. (2002) Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Benhabib, Seyla (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Brubaker, Rogers (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Brubaker, Rogers (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in 
the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brubaker, Rogers and Jaeeun Kin (2011) “Transborder Membership Politics in 
Germany and Korea’, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 52, No. 1), pp. 21-75. 
Constitution of Republic of Macedonia, 1991, 
http://www.sobranie.mk/?ItemID=A431BEE83F63594B8FE11DA66C97BEAF. 
Čok, Vida (1996) “Povodom donošenja Zakona o jugoslovenskom državljanstvu“, 
Republika: Glasilo građanskog samooslobađanja, Vol. 8, No. 145-146. (August 1996), 
http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/96/145/index.html. 
Dumbrava, Costica (2010) “How illiberal are citizenship rules in European Union 
countries?”, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2010/50. 
Džankić, Jelena (2010) “Transformations of Citizenship in Montenegro: a context-
generated evolution of citizenship policies”, CITSEE Working Paper Series 2010/03. 
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/20                         34 
 
 
e-Novine [online],  http://www.e-novine.com/feljton/48424-ako-otkriju-nae-vojnike-
preko-Drine.html. 
EUDO [online], http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/306-hungarian-
government-proposes-access-to-citizenship-for-ethnic-hungarians-in-neighbouring-
countries.  
Gasca, Viorelia (2010), “Country Report: Moldova”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory 
RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR 2010/18. 
Gerring, John (1999) ‘What Makes a Concept Good? A Critical Framework for 
Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences’, Polity, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 
357-393. 
Hanley, Sean (2004) “Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-
Communist Europe”. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 20, No. 
3, pp. 9-27. 
Howard, Marc Morje (2006) “Comparative citizenship: an agenda for cross-national 
research”. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 443-455. 
Iordachi, Constantin (2010) “Country Report: Romania”, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR. 2010/20. 
Joppke, Christian (2003) “Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization”, European 
Journal of Sociology, 44 (3): 429-458. 
Joppke, Christian (2005) Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State. 
Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. 
Joppke, Christian (2010). Citizenship and Immigration. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
King, Charles (2000) The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Hoover 
Institution Press. 
King, Charles and Neil J. Melvin (1999) “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign 
Policy, and Security in Eurasia”. International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 108-138. 
Kovacs, Maria and Judit Toth (2010) “Country Report: Hungary”, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR. 2010/36. 
Krasniqi, Gezim (2010a) “The Challenge of Building an Independent Citizenship 
Regime in a Partially Recognized State: the Case of Kosovo”, CITSEE Working Paper 
Series 2010/04. 
Krasniqi, Gezim (2010b), “Citizenship in an emigrant nation-state: the case of 
Albania”, CITSEE Working Paper Series 2010/13. 
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/20                         35 
 
 
Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1999 (2003), http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/BIH%20Law%20on%20Citizenship%20of%20BIH%2
0(original).pdf. 
Lilić, Stevan, Dušan Janjić, Biljana Kovačević-Vučo (2001) Odnosi Srbije i Crne Gore i 
implikacije na državljanski status građana SRJ. Beograd: Jugoslovenski komitet pravnika 
za ljudska prava and European Stability Initiative. 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_21.pdf 
Mair, Peter and Cass Mudde (1998) “The party family and its study”. Annual Review 
of Political Science, Vol 1, No. 1, pp. 211-229. 
Marko, Joseph (2009) “The New Kosovo Constitution in a Regional Comparative 
Perspective”. Review of Central and East European Law, Vol, 33, No. 4, pp. 437-450. 
Medved, Felicita (2010) “Country Report: Slovenia”, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 
RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR. 2010/21. 
Novinite [online], http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=138790.  
Petersen, Roger D. (2002) Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment 
in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ragazzi, Francesco and Kristina Balalovska (2010) “Diaspora Politics and Post-
Territorial Citizenship in Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia”, CITSEE Working Paper 
Series 2011/18. 
Ragazzi, Francesco and Igor Štiks (2010) “Country Report: Croatia”, EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR. 2010/5. 
Raine, Janos M (2005) ‘Submerging or Clinging on Again? Jozsef Antall, Father and 
Son, in Hungary after 1956. 
Rava, Nenad (2010) “Serbia: Elusive Citizenship in an Elusive Nation-State”, CITSEE 
Working Paper Series 2010/08. 
Sarajlić, Eldar (2010) “The Bosnian Triangle: Ethnicity, Politics and Citizenship”, 
CITSEE Working Paper Series 2010/06. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1970) ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 1033-1053. 
SEEbiz [online], http://rs.seebiz.eu/bih-ratifikovala-ugovor-o-dvojnom-drzavljanstvu-
sa-hrvatskom/ar-16418/. 
SETimes [online]a, 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/201
2/06/26/feature-03.  
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/20                         36 
 
 
SETimes [online]b, 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/201
2/02/24/feature-03. 
Shaw, Jo and Igor Štiks (2010) “The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor 
States of the Former Yugoslavia: an introduction”, CITSEE Working Paper Series 
2010/01. 
Shevel, Oxana (2009) “The Politics of Citizenship Policy in New States”, Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 273-291. 
Shevel, Oxana (2010) “The Post-Communist Diaspora Laws Beyond the “Good Civic 
vs. Bad Ethnic” Nationalism Dichotomy.” East European Politics & Societies Vol. 24, 
No 1, pp. 159-187. 
Smilov, Daniel and Elena Jileva (2010) “Country Report: Bulgaria”, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR. 2010/4. 
Štiks, Igor (2010) ‘The Citizenship Conundrum in Post-Communist Europe: The 
Instructive Case of Croatia’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 62, No. 10, pp. 1621-1638. 
Spaskovska, Ljubica (2010) “Macedonia’s Nationals, Minorities and Refugees in the 
Post-Communist Labyrinths of Citizenship”, CITSEE Working Paper Series 2010/05. 
Spaskovska, Ljubica (2010a) “In Search of Demos: transformations of citizenship and 
belonging in the Republic of Macedonia”, CITSEE Working Paper Series 2010/11. 
Vink, Maarten Peter and Rainer Bauböck (2011) “Citizenship Configurations. 
Analysing the multiple purposes of citizenship laws in 33 European states (1991-
2011)”, Paper presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference, University of Island, 25-
27 August 2011. 
Waterbury, Myra A (2010) Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and Kin-state 
Nationalism in Hungary. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Wittenberg, Jason (2006) Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral 
Continuity in Hungary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wolf, Stefan (2005) “The Limits of Non-Military International Intervention: A Case 
Study of the Kosovo Conflict”, in: Understanding the War in Kosovo, Florian Bieber and 
Židas Daskalovski (eds.). London and Portland, OR: Frank Casss. 
World Bank (2006) Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Zincone, Giovanna and Marzia Basili (2010) “Country Report: Italy”, EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR. 2010/35. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
